Nuclear standoff: Pakistan has called India's bluff
Subodh Atal,
July 1, 2002
Also appeared in
tehelka.com
The much-hyped nuclear standoff between India and Pakistan that began in
mid-May ended with a tame whimper in early June. India had been threatening,
off and on since last October, to attack terrorist bases in
Pakistan-controlled territories, from where operations against civilians and
security personnel in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of India are
organized. Pakistan, in return, had been threatening to escalate such a
conflict, including the use of nuclear weapons, rather than end terrorist
sponsorship.
India's demands of Pakistan were analogous to those of the US last year
against the Taliban after September 11 - hand over terrorist leaders and
disband the terrorist infrastructure, or else. The difference was that the
Taliban did not have access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Thus
whether India really meant to carry out its threats was never clear. Pakistan
did not back down until the proverbial last moment. In fact, on the weekend of
Richard Armitage's "facilitating" visit at the height of the
standoff, Pakistan tested three ballistic missiles, all pointedly named after
Islamic invaders that had brutalized, massacred and converted Hindus.
During Armitage's visit, he appears to have carried a message to India
conveying Musharraf's commitment to "permanently" eradicating the
terrorist infrastructure. The Indian leadership meekly acquiesced, and started
an immediate process of deescalation, withdrawing its naval ships that had
closed in on the Karachi harbor. There was no historical basis for believing
such a promise. Musharraf had after all wreaked Kargil three years ago, and
his most recent January promise to withdraw terrorists from Jammu and Kashmir
had proven to be an act of blatant international deceit.
India rationalized the deescalation, despite past experiences with
Musharraf, by saying that this time the US and British had guaranteed his
commitment. The Indian leadership also proclaimed that it would be watching
for serious action on the ground by Pakistan in the next few weeks and months.
But one did not have to wait that long to understand the dictator's true
intentions. A dead give-away was the proposal by Armitage and Donald Rumsfeld
to lay US high-tech ground sensors on the LOC. If the US believed Musharraf's
word on ending infiltration, what would be the need for such sensors?
The Pakistan establishment has made a science out of deceiving India, the
US, and anyone else that matters. Statements were issued by Pakistani
terrorist leaders denouncing Musharraf for stopping infiltration and shutting
down camps. Of course none of this was happening. Infiltration continues till
today, and at best the camps may have simply been relocated to make it harder
for satellites to track. The jehadis were saved to fight for Islam in Kashmir
and the rest of India another day. India had backed off, and Pakistan had
given nothing in return except meaningless promises.
Many will say that a nuclear catastrophe was averted, and South Asia was
saved a horrific fate through US intervention (call it facilitation,
mediation, whatever). Given the jehadi mentality of Pakistan's military
leadership and its closeness to the Pakistani wings of the Al Qaeda, nuclear
strikes by Pakistan in event of conventional victories by India are a
possibility. However, the US also knew that India was bluffing, and no such
conflict was about to start. Its travel warnings and call on US nationals to
leave India were thus meant more to pressurize and bully India into falling
for yet another set of false Pakistani promises.
A comprehensive propaganda campaign was also undertaken to erode the
confidence of the average Indian in taking on Pakistan. The estimated number
of Indian nuclear weapons was suddenly reduced in comparison to Pakistan's
arsenal in reports originating in the US, and the quality of Indian military
equipment was questioned, notwithstanding well known facts about Pakistan's
air force and its limited ability to sustain a conventional war.
The US is celebrating its tactical victory and claims that it pulled South
Asia back from the brink. However, strategically, both India and the United
States have decisively lost this round. Pakistan has called India's bluff,
right up to the brink, and now it is even more convinced that its nuclear
arsenal will allow it to carry out sponsorhip of terrorism in Jammu and
Kashmir for years to come. In a few years, Pakistan will have hundreds of
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. No missile defense system will be
sufficient for India in case of war, leaving it increasingly more vulnerable
to nuclear blackmail. Terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism will spread beyond
Jammu and Kashmir and will eventually sunder India, a goal that Pakistani
terrorist groups proudly talk of. This is what is in store for India, as a
result of its latest display of meekness.
As for the US, it lost a golden chance to collaborate with India and wipe
out the current base of the Al Qaeda in Pakistan. It could have threatened
Pakistan with dire consequences if the Pakistani terrorist groups were not
disbanded. But it did no such thing. The Al Qaeda is plotting future attacks
on US interests from its Pakistani hideouts, keeping Americans on their toes
with constant alerts. The US also failed to understand the international
consequence of allowing Pakistan to use nuclear blackmail. Many other rogue
nations now look up to Pakistan and sense that the world's sole super power
can not stop a determined country from using nuclear threats to back
terrorism. Futhermore, the close links between Islamic fundamentalists and the
Pakistani military leadership make it inevitable that the Al Qaeda will
inevitably have access to nuclear weapons sooner or later.
Of course Musharraf won by preventing a war that would have surely
destroyed much of his terrorist infrastructure, and gained the confidence of
the jehadis by privately allowing them freedom of operation despite US and
Indian pressure. His ability to deceive and juggle his anointed role as an
"anti-terrorist ally" is invaluable to the jehadis, and they are
unlikely to act against him for that reason. Contrary to popular belief, a
more openly extreme leader is more likely to force the US hand against the
Pakistani terrorist infrastructure and thus bring about decisive success in
the war against terrorism.
Thus the score in this round was Musharraf and the jehadis, 1, and India
and the US 0. But don't count on this being the last standoff. The lineup of
the adversaries and the issues stays the same regardless of any deescalation.
The final match is yet to start.
