Whither Kashmir Peace Process: International
Jehad vs. A Soft Nation
Subodh Atal,
June 2001
50 Years of Freefall Down the Fundamentalist Path
The general antecedents of the "Kashmir
Dispute" are well known to many international observers who follow South
Asian politics. A half-century old standoff continues into the year 2001.
Pakistan's quest to snatch the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is sold to
the rest of the world as the unfinished business of the 1947 Partition of
India. While most states followed their religious leanings, Jammu and Kashmir,
ruled by the Hindu maharaja Hari Singh, opted for India after Pakistan
orchestrated an invasion to force its hand. The Pakistani invaders settled for
the one-third of the state that they had occupied, driving out Hindus and
pro-Indian Muslims. During the half century since, Pakistan has settled
Punjabi Muslims in Kashmiri territory occupied by it, driving down the
Kashmiri-speaking population to a negligible number. On the other hand, India,
keeping true to its secular nature, accorded a special status to the state,
embodied in Article 370. The article prevents people from the rest of India
from settling in or freely carrying out business in the state. It also allows
the state to ignore equal protection of minorities as enshrined in the Indian
constitution.
Kashmiri Pandits – Caught in The Islamic Vise
A result of this special treatment of the state was a
socio-economic disaster for minorities, especially Hindus in Kashmir valley
between 1948-1989. Over half the million strong population of indigenous
Kashmir Pandits fled to other parts of India as valley Muslims converted their
status into hegemony across the valley as well as the entire state. Due to
Article 370, the sobering and secular influences of the rest of India never
permeated the state, while fundamentalist influences from across the border
built up ominously. By 1987-1989, the peaceful valley had taken a Talibanic
turn long before the term became notorious for the extreme style of Islamic
nation born in Afghanistan. It was no longer safe for a kafir (non-believer).
As the Soviets started to exit Afghanistan during the
same time period, Pakistan rapidly switched its attention to Kashmir.
Logistical know-how acquired from the CIA in guerilla warfare was successfully
transferred against India, including the use of religious fundamentalism. The
Kashmir valley was ripe for upheaval, having already been allowed to lose its
diverse composition and character for four decades. The mix exploded in 1989,
with the ethnic cleansing by Pakistan-supported Kashmiri Muslims of almost the
entire remaining population of Pandits, about 300,000. The Indian government
has since severely compounded their problems, and its own chances of bringing
about normalcy, by ignoring their voice in the future of the state.
Countering Jehad: The Challenges
The insurgency has been sustained since then by
Pakistan, and its brainchild the Taliban, with an increasing emphasis on
fundamentalism and jehad, and liberal use of dozens of well-funded
international terrorist bases in both countries. In 1991, India looked to
repeat the history of 1965, when it opened up a broad-based war to force an
end to a Pakistani invasion of the state. However, Pakistan had by then
acquired nuclear weapons, and effectively used the threat of nuclear strikes
to avert what would have been certain war to end the invasion. Since then the
Pakistani nuclear card has been a standard blackmail tactic to keep its
support for the largest international terrorist operation alive.
The Indian government has tried different means to
counter the onslaught, hoping each time to capitalize on the local
population's fatigue with the endless violence. In 1996-1997, popular
elections were held at the state and central levels, and a trend towards
normalcy became evident, forcing Pakistan to rethink its strategies in
sustaining the insurgency. Predictably, Pakistan responded by turning up the
heat, handing over the reins of the insurgency to the most extreme of the
terrorist groups, Lashkar-e-Toiba, in collaboration with Osama Bin-Laden's Al
Qaida group. It also formed the United Jehad Council to ensure unity and focus
among the myriad terrorist groups operating from its territory.
This refueling of the fires of Kashmir has proved to
be self-sustaining and reticent. Now tens of thousands of madrassas in
Pakistan and Afghanistan that train young impressionable minds combined with a
collapsed inward-looking economy that gives the impoverished population few
other choices for its children.
The second attempt began in 2000, after Hizbul
Mujahideen's temporary ceasefire. Hizbul, the only indigenous Kashmiri
terrorist group, felt the fatigue of the Kashmiri population and offered a
unilateral ceasefire. It did not last, however, as Pakistan set loose the
Lashkar in an orgy of killing. After the Hizbul, under intense pressure from
its Pakistani sponsors, withdrew its ceasefire, India followed up with its own
unilateral ceasefire in the last weeks of the year. The idea was to tap into
the palpable Kashmiri fatigue with violence. The Indian military ended all
offensive operations.
Peace Process: At What Cost?
The "peace process" has essentially
consisted of avoidance of offensive operations by Indian security forces,
attempts to engage Kashmiri separatist politicians, and official invitations
to various Kashmiri groups to start discussions on resolving the issues. The
most visible result has been the utter disregard for the ceasefire displayed
by Pakistan's terrorist groups, which have increased killings of civilians
including pro-India politicians and minority Hindu and Sikhs, as well as
security personnel deployed to protect them. Deaths among terrorists have
decreased, easily attributable to lack of new Indian offensives. Thus the
short-term cost of the ceasefire has been borne out by civilians and hapless
security personnel who have their hands tied behind their back against the
deadliest terrorist forces of the world.
Behind-the-scenes efforts were carried out to send
feelers to the leaders of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), a
conglomerate of pro-separatist parties. After a charade of discussions among
its executive committee, the Hurriyat summarily rejected the talks offer of
the central government. What was their excuse to shut their eyes to the
glimmer of hope? That the central government had invited too many groups from
across the state. Abdul Ghani Bhat, leader of the Hurriyat used the word
"fish-market" to describe the government's approach. Thus
effectively all separatist organizations, militant and most of the political
ones, have rejected the ceasefire.
Getting to the Heart of the Kashmir Dispute
This last episode serves as a window into the reasons
for the intractability and the violence that the state has suffered for
decades. When Bhat used the term "fish-market", minorities in the
state knew all too well what he was talking about. For five decades, valley
Muslims have enjoyed total hegemony over the entire state, squeezing out
minorities whether religious, ethnic or regional. When the Indian government
invited a cross-section of groups of the state for negotiations, it signalled
a break from the Indian policy followed the past half century – valley
Muslims were not accorded recognition as the sole representatives of the
state. With the Indian government looking the other way, all minorities had
been sidelined before and during the insurgency.
Clearly, what rankled both Hurriyat and the voice it
really represents – that of Pakistan, were unhappy that India wanted to deal
with other groups in the state. This was a blow to their long-established
strategy - establish total hegemony over most of the state to the point where
it looks, talks, and acts more like Pakistan and hence the solution will
become evident. While the "peace process" appears indeed headed on a
"train to nowhere", the crux of the Kashmir dispute stands
thoroughly exposed.
Is There Hope?
The question now is whether a significant section of
Kashmir valley's population will break free of the shackles of fundamentalism,
jehad and violence that it has locked itself in since 1989. The prospects are
grim and the reasons are to be found in two places – Pakistan and India.
Pakistan's entire identity now depends on its fight to grab Kashmir. It has
created a self-sustaining jehad industry that keeps large sections of its
military, religious and political bodies gainfully occupied. The grooming of
children in madrassas from a very young age will keep the flames burning for
generations. Collaboration with Bin Laden's network, recruitment of Muslims
from around the world, and promises to create "more Pakistans" in
India are ominous signs.
The other side of course is India itself, which has
soft-pedaled valley Muslims since Sheikh Abdullah bullied through a special
status for the state soon after its accession to India. India has allowed
valley Muslims to attain a highly exalted view of themselves, as a result of
Article 370 and regular coddling. In 1965 and 1971, India frittered away
hard-fought gains back to Pakistan. In 1999, the Kargil invasion was met by a
self-imposed ban on crossing the LOC. In December of the same year, India
caved in to Indian Airlines hijackers and released top Pakistani terrorist
leaders. A hundred odd lives were saved momentarily, at the cost of thousands
of civilians and security personnel who have since been butchered by the
rabidly extremist Jaish group formed by released terrorist inspiration Masood
Azhar. Even tiny Bangladesh has taken advantage of the soft Indian state,
recently capturing and then torturing to death more than a dozen Indian border
guards.
The ceasefire is ill-timed and reveals the bankruptcy
of Indian strategic thinking. Such a step would have been on the dot if it had
been taken after a prolonged offensive that decimated Pakistani terrorist
ranks and had them on the run. However, the many terrorist groups have simply
recognized the current ceasefire as weakness on India's part, and are now
preparing to enlarge their operations in the coming warmer season. This
explains the reflexive rejection of the ceasefire and negotiation offers by
these groups as well as by Hurriyat, which simply follows their diktat.
Conclusion
Jammu and Kashmir, and in fact the entire Indian
nation, is at a crossroads today both due to Pakistan's ability to create a
massive, self-sustained terrorist enterprise, as well as the soft nation
characteristics of India. Caught in between are many sections of the state's
population, such as the Hindus who are in exile, and others who live as
virtual hostages of terrorists and their supporters in the state. At this
juncture, India can cave in further and agree to handing over some or all of
the state to fundamentalist elements controlled by Pakistan, or it can dig in
its heels acknowledging Jammu and Kashmir as the last frontier in the fight to
prevent further Talibanization of the subcontinent. The latter choice may seem
to be more painful, and will require long-term measures such as abrogation of
Article 370 and recognition of equal rights of Pandits, Sikhs, Gujjars,
Bakerwals and residents of Jammu and Ladakh. Reorganization of the state, and
its full socioeconomic integration with the rest of India will be requisite
steps in such a scenario. The former choice will undoubtedly result in a new
satellite state of Pakistan, and the establishment of secure bases to export
Talibanization and insurgency into the rest of India. Whether India can
reverse its well-deserved "soft-state" status and take the tough
steps needed is open to question.
