It is our Kashmir too
Subodh Atal, Lalit Koul, Sunil Fotedar
Source: www.chalomumbai.com
July 14, 2001
The
historical summit between India and Pakistan is an opportune time to reexamine
Indian response to the Kashmir issue. Jammu and Kashmir was one of the
princely states of British India whose accession to India has never been
accepted by Pakistan, which supports a long-standing insurgency in the state.
While Pakistan settled millions of non-Kashmiris in
parts of the territory that it occupied, India institutionalized Article 370,
which prevents Indians from outside the state from settling in it, grants the
state semi-autonomy, and confers on its Kashmiri Muslim leadership an
unbridled hegemonic hold on the state.
Plight of the Pandits ignored
This resulted in decades of virtual segregation of the
state from the rest of India, resulting in a growth of fundamentalism and
Taliban-like atmosphere in the Kashmir valley by 1989.
Kashmiri Pandits bore the brunt of this phenomenon.
They were discriminated against politically, economically and socially,
forcing several hundred thousands to migrate to other parts of India between
1948 to 1989.
At the outset of the insurgency in 1989, they paid
for their patriotism as Muslims targeted them with killings, rapes and
torture. The vast majority of remaining Pandits (over 350,000) fled to squalid
refugee camps in Jammu, Delhi and other cities. Rather than rewarding the
Pandits for their loyalty, India is guilty not only of ignoring their plight
but also of excluding them from negotiations on Kashmir, thus converting it
into a Muslim-only issue.
Today India is a vibrant democracy rapidly on its way
up the economic ladder. Pakistan is an economic and social basket case in
constant need of IMF largesse. Pakistan shouldn't be able to sustain such an
enterprise for a few months, let alone 12 years. Then what is it that sustains
the Kashmir issue that has been termed a "nuclear flashpoint"?
Reward for terrorism?
The answer lies in Pakistani perceptions about India.
There was a recent report about Pakistani cricketers believing that the Indian
team was like a shaky wall - one last push and it would come down crumbling.
The same is true for Pakistan vs. India politics.
Indeed, in the last 12 years, the
Pakistan-Afghanistan jehad enterprise, in the wake of Indian meekness and
western equivocation, has expanded to become the terrorist hub of the world.
At this point the jehadi Pakistan mindset believes firmly that India is making
concessions as a result of the 12-year long insurgency, and has willingly
abandoned its Kashmiri Pandit population as part of its appeasement approach.
Musharraf is not coming to Agra to negotiate a settlement, but to extract the
rewards of 12 years of terrorism on behalf of the jehadis.
India's strategy - Panun Kashmir
So what should be India's strategy at the summit and
beyond? A mere freezing of the LOC, as suggested by many Indians, will merely
perpetuate the problems already described above. And of course the various
forms of "independence" suggested for Kashmir will undoubtedly
create a second Afghanistan, with severe ramifications for the rest of India.
There is a third way. The territory of Panun
("Our") Kashmir has been proposed by Kashmiri Pandits as a means to
bring secularism, religious freedom and security back to the valley. As part
of this framework, Jammu and Ladakh would become separate states, and a Panun
Kashmir region carved out of the valley, with abrogation of Article 370.
Panun Kashmir would allow over 700,000 Kashmiri
Pandits to return safely to their homeland. It would also become a magnet for
Indians willing to work in technology and other expanding industries. The
Panun Kashmir territory with returning Pandits, and other Indians, including
pro-India Kashmiri Muslims, would create a buffer against further export of
jehad into India, leading to rapid economic recovery and equal rights to all
groups.
Thus the architect of the Kargil war should be told
firmly that India believes Kashmir is "Ours", we are willing to
stand by it, and will take tough, long term steps to stop the continued export
of Islamic fervor and terrorist violence into the state.